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INTRODUCTION
In late June of 2018, The Boston Globe ran a front-page story with
the headline “$432,000 Salaries Outrage Officials.”1 The story began, “In
cash-strapped Methuen, where the average resident earns just under $32,000
a year, five police captains stand to each make a whopping $432,295 a year
*
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. Thanks to Paul Vasiloff for being
an excellent research assistance, to participants in the Labor Law Symposium at Belmont
University College of Law, and to their staff for helpful comments of earlier drafts.
1. Michael Levenson, $432,000 Salaries Outrage Officials, BOS. GLOBE, June 25,
2018, at A-1.
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under their new contract, according to an analysis by the city auditor that has
outraged residents and officials.”2
Methuen is not, by any measure, an affluent city by Massachusetts
standards.3 Yet, the Globe story describes expected payouts to the city’s
highest paid police officers that would exceed the salaries paid to the
governor,4 the Boston Police Commissioner,5 and the Superintendent of the
state police.6 To further complicate matters, the Globe reported that Methuen
recently “laid off [fifty-two] public school teachers, nine school
administrators, and additional support staff as a result of a $6.5 million
shortfall in the budget.”7
Loyal readers rightly wondered how this could possibly have
occurred—i.e., how could a small, struggling city agree to these
extraordinary salaries for a handful of public safety officers as they were
laying off teachers and contemplating a loan from the state in order to
forestall municipal bankruptcy? Well, it turns out the mayor—one James
Jajuga—has a police captain son who stands to benefit directly from the
newly signed contract between the police union and the city.8 Mr. Jajuga
voted for the new contract while he was a city council member in 2017.9
Jajuga now says he was assured by the previous mayor that the contract
simply provided for 2% raises. While the former mayor “could not be reached
for comment,” he has said “that he blames his negotiating team and the
auditor . . . for not alerting him to the full financial impact of the contract.”10
A careful read of the contract (which it appears now-Mayor Jajuga
never bothered with) does reveal that it provides for 2% increases; it also
reveals “a complex formula requiring officers’ benefits be calculated as part
of their base pay, which means they are receiving a 2[%] increase on a much
2. Id.
3. Settled in 1642, Methuen is a small city north of Boston that reported a population
of 47,255 and a median household income of $61,822 in the 2010 census. Methuen Town city,
Massachusetts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2010) (available at https://factfinder.census.gov/faces
/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml).
4. Levenson, supra note 1 (stating that Republican Charlie Baker earns $151,800
annually).
5. Id. (stating that William B. Evans earns a salary of $238,846). Evans is chief of the
state’s largest city with a population of 685,094. Boston city, Massachusetts, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (July 1, 2017) (available at https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/commu
nity_facts.xhtml); See also Stephen Beale, Boston’s Highest Paid City Employees Earn
Approximately $300,000, NEW BOS. POST (Oct. 18, 2016, 9:32 AM),
http://newbostonpost.com/2016/10/18/bostons-highest-paid-city-employees-earn-300000/.
6. Levenson, supra note 1 (stating that Richard McKeon was earning $386,829 when
he stepped down in 2018).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.

2019]

COMMON-SENSE DEFENSE OF JANUS

43

higher salary.”11 This generous definition of base pay is then further
amplified by a new requirement that
each rank . . . must earn a certain percentage more than the
one below it. So[,] the sergeants’ base pay is increased to
include their benefits, which is then used to calculate the
base pay of the lieutenants, who then in turn would have
their benefits added in when calculating the pay for
captains.12
This is apparently common enough to be known as a “stacking
effect,” and it explains the enormous salaries of the highest ranking and
longest serving members of the force. It is worth noting that the city council
approved this contract on a nine to zero vote (three members of the council
have family members who work for the police department and two others
were planning to take jobs in the department).14 To top it all off, Captain
Gallant, president of the Methuen Police Superior Officers Association,
noted that the contract “is quite clear in its language” and that the dispute
could end in litigation.15
This story stands out for its shockingly large numbers and the crude,
post-revelation efforts by irresponsible elected officials to distance
themselves from their own decision making. However, the basic scenario is
playing out in many small and large cities throughout the country—many of
them struggling financially.16 How these states and municipalities ended up
13

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. For a more in-depth discussion of the “stacking effect,” see Chris Edwards, Public
Sector Unions and the Rising Costs of Employee Compensation, 30 CATO J. 87 (2010).
14. Levenson, supra note 1.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Chicago’s Financial Crisis by the Numbers, CHI. SUN-TIMES (June 24,
2016, 11:10 AM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/opinion/chicagos-financial-crisis-by-thenumbers/ (“Because of the city’s weak finances, driven by its massive pension debt, rating
agencies over the last few years repeatedly have downgraded Chicago’s bond rating. This
drives up borrowing costs. Only Detroit has a worse rating. Moody’s Investors Service rates
Chicago two levels above junk status.”); Erin Cox, Md Officials Warn State Debt Threatens
Construction Projects, BALT. SUN (Dec. 11, 2015, 6:15 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/
news/maryland/politics/bs-md-debt-threatens-projects-20151211-story.html (“Construction
projects that would have been paid for in cash were instead financed with debt, the freed-up
revenue used to support the ongoing expenses of running the state government.”); Monica
Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles Into Insolvency, N.Y.
TIMES (July 18, 2013) (“Instead, numerous factors over many years have brought Detroit to
this point, including a shrunken tax base but still a huge, 139-square-mile city to maintain;
overwhelming health care and pension costs; repeated efforts to manage mounting debts with
still more borrowing; annual deficits in the city’s operating budget since 2008; and city
services crippled by aged computer systems, poor record-keeping and widespread
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in these straits, and what can and should be done to begin to ameliorate
“stacking effect”-like contracts that result from a distorted relationship
between public employers (Methuen) and their public sector unions is the
subject of this paper.
Many scholars and others have, for some time now, been calling
attention to the alarming growth in post-employment and other benefits for
unionized employees in the public sector.17 A fairly well-understood
dysfunction.”); Judy Lin, The Cost of California’s Public Pensions is Rising Fast. But Efforts
to Fix the Problem by Ballot Measure Have Fizzled, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-me-pension-crisis-initiatives/ (“Pension reform advocates
say that achieving real relief in the near term will require reductions in benefits already granted
to current employees.”); Karisma Maheshwari, Philadelphia Ranks 73rd Out of 75 Major U.S.
Cities in Financial Health, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN (Mar. 22, 2018, 9:38 PM),
http://www.thedp.com/article/2018/03/philadelphia-debt-report-upenn-penn-financial-health
(“Truth in Accounting attributes much of Philadelphia’s poor financial health to long-term
debt and financial obligations in pension and retiree health care benefits.”); Katharine Shilcutt,
Houston is in Bad Financial Shape, Says Fiscal Times, HOUSTANIA (Jan. 11, 2017, 2:30 PM),
https://www.houstoniamag.com/articles/2017/1/11/houston-is-in-bad-financial-shape-saysfiscal-times (“We don’t normally put much stock in rankings or ratings, . . . [b]ut it’s hard to
argue against Houston’s outstanding pension obligations.”); David Smiley, Miami Taxpayers
Carry Outsized Debt Burden, Report Says, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 11, 2017, 6:30 AM),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article125721849.html
(“Repeated decisions by Miami city officials to kick long-term pension and healthcare
obligations down the road to be paid by future generations of taxpayers have left city residents
with an outsized debt burden, according to a new report by a financial watchdog agency.”);
Romy Varghese, Even San Francisco, Flush with Wealth, Has Pension Problems,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 20, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0320/even-san-francisco-flush-with-tech-wealth-has-pension-problems
(“The
technology
industry has transformed San Francisco with a boom other cities can only envy. But it hasn’t
eradicated a problem well known to industrial-era towns: the rising cost of pensions.”); Mary
Williams Walsh & Karl Russell, New York City Pensions Are Still in Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (June
20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/20/business/dealbook/new-yorkcity-pensions.html (“The Manhattan Institute, a research center focusing on urban affairs and
domestic policy, prefers market values, which put the [unfunded pension] shortfall at about
$142 billion, more than twice the city’s shortfall estimate.”).
17. See, e.g., THOMAS J. FITZPATRICK & AMY B. MONAHAN, FED. RES. BANK
CLEVELAND, WHO’S AFRAID OF GOOD GOVERNANCE? STATE FISCAL CRISES, PUBLIC PENSION
UNDERFUNDING, AND THE RESISTANCE TO GOVERNANCE REFORM 1 (2012) (“If neither plan
participants nor state taxpayers are able to effectively monitor and challenge a state’s
inadequate funding or improper investment decisions, public plans are very likely to remain
underfunded.”); JOSHUA D. RAUH, HOOVER INST., HIDDEN DEBT, HIDDEN DEFICITS: 2017
EDITION 2 (2017) (“What is in fact going on is that the governments are borrowing from
workers and promising to repay that debt when they retire, but the accounting standards allow
the bulk of this debt to go unreported through the assumption of high rates of return.”); Jack
M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 6 (2013) (“While most
public employers and employees in the United States set aside money each year to fund future
projected pension obligations, many public pension plans are seriously underfunded either
intentionally or due to unrealistic assumptions concerning investment performance and the
amount that will be owed over time. This means that unless contributions are increased
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phenomenon is thought to explain the inability of state and local governments
to resist outsized demands from their public unions. As I18 and others19 have
argued, the central problem with public sector unions is that they find it easy
to capture their employers (taxpayers) in ways that private sector unions
cannot. The role played by often eager and feckless elected officials in this
process has also been well documented.20
substantially, future pension payments to retired government workers will be made, at least in
part, from current revenues. The problem is thought to be so serious that some local
governments may be effectively insolvent.”); Maria O’Brien Hylton, Combating Moral
Hazard: The Case for Rationalizing Public Employee Benefits, 45 IND. L. REV. 413, 453–54
(2012) (“The astonishing debt figures that GASB 45 finally forced states to report are the
logical result of years of rent-seeking by legislators and public sector unions. Well organized
unions push hard for improved benefits. Politicians, who are legally obligated to negotiate
with these unions on behalf of the taxpayers, understand that strong union support in the form
of votes and dollars can be secured by increasing compensation to the union’s membership.”);
Rhiannon Jerch et al., Efficient Local Government Service Provision: The Role of
Privatization and Public Sector Unions 27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No.
22,088, 2016) (“Strong union bargaining power in non-right-to-work states appears to increase
the number of full time employees on pay roll, holding the service area constant. These effects
are most pronounced for a city’s largest transit agency, which suggests public sector unions
shift their bargaining pressure toward the dominant transit agencies such as Chicago’s CTA,
New York’s MTA, or Boston’s MBTA.”); Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, The
Revenue Demands of Public Employee Pension Promises, 6 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 193,
193 (2014) [hereinafter Novy-Marx & Rauh, Revenue Demands] (“Without policy changes,
contributions would have to increase by 2.5 times [to achieve full funding of state and local
pension systems in the United States over 30 years], reaching 14.1% of the total own-revenue
generated by state and local governments. This represents a tax increase of $1,385 per
household per year, about half of which [would go] to pay down legacy liabilities while half
[would fund] the cost of new promises.”); Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua Rauh, Public Pension
Promises: How Big Are They and What Are They Worth?, 66 J. FIN. 1211, 1245-46 (2011)
(“We find that the pension promises already made to state workers are worth at least $3.20
trillion as far as taxpayers are concerned, under the assumption that the state can default on
these promises to the same extent that it can default on its general obligation debt. This is a
conservative estimate because most state constitutions suggest that pension promises are
higher in priority than general obligation debt.”); Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, The
Liabilities and Risks of State Sponsored Pension Plans, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 191 (2009)
[hereinafter Novy-Marx & Rauh, Liabilities and Risks].
18. See Maria O’Brien Hylton, Friedrichs and the Move Toward Private Ordering of
Wages and Benefits in the Public Sector (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law and Legal Theory
Working Paper No. 16-34, 2016); Maria Hylton, Central Falls Retirees v. Bondholders:
Assessing Fear of Contagion in Chapter 9 Proceedings, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 525 (2013)
[hereinafter Hylton, Central Falls].
19. See Jerch, supra note 17; Chris Edwards, Public Sector Unions and the Rising Costs
of Employee Compensation, 30 CATO J. 87, 87 (2010); Robert G. Valletta, The Impact of
Unionism on Municipal Expenditures and Revenues, 42 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 430, 430
(1989).
20. Jack M. Beermann, Professor of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Scholar, offers this
analysis of the politician’s role in extreme pension liability: “Unfunded pension promises
benefit politicians in two ways. First, as in all deficit spending, they allow for current officials
to provide services without requiring taxpayers to pay for them until much later, when they
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This paper seeks to turn the focus from a now well-recognized
problem toward the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Janus v. American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees21 and to consider
changes we might expect to see in the short and medium term. The Court’s
conclusion—that its forty-year-old decision in Abood v. Detriot Board of
Education22 should be overturned on First Amendment grounds—did not
come as much of a surprise.23 Agency fees, the Court held, are inconsistent
with the First Amendment in so far as they compel speech in a manner that
cannot survive “exacting scrutiny.”24 Whether or not Janus and its view of
may be out of office. Second, pension promises help politicians shore up support among
government workers, or at least avoid opposition from government workers, which would be
substantial if significant reductions in pension benefits were proposed.” Beermann, supra note
17, at 27.
21. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
22. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
23. Adam Liptak, A Supreme Court Showdown Could Shrink Unions’ Power, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/22/us/politics/supreme-courtunions.html (“The Supreme Court is back to full strength with Mr. Trump’s appointment of
Justice Neil M. Gorsuch, and most observers believe the new justice will join the court’s other
conservatives to deliver a decision that will hurt public unions.”); Jessica Levinson, Supreme
Court Decision on Janus v. AFSCME Likely to Permanently Weaken Public Unions, NBC
NEWS (Feb. 26, 2018, 4:36 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/supreme-courtdecision-janus-v-afscme-likely-permanently-weaken-public-ncna851376 (“Although we
won’t find out the court’s decision until early summer, the cynical prediction that the court
will vote five-to-four — with a decision that benefits Republicans and harms Democrats — is
likely true.”); David G. Savage, Supreme Court Poised to Deal a Sharp Blow to Unions For
Teachers and Public Employees, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2017, 11:05 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-court-unions-20170928-story.html (“Now, the
court has agreed to hear a new case presenting the same issue. And this time, Justice Neil M.
Gorsuch can — and most likely will — supply the fifth vote for a conservative ruling.”).
24. In determining the proper level of scrutiny for agency fees, the majority in Janus
sought to strike a balance between “strict scrutiny,” advocated for by the petitioner, and
rational-basis scrutiny, advocated for by the respondents. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465. Under the
“exacting scrutiny” standard, the agency fee arrangement must “serve a compelling state
interest that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms.” Id. (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 567 U.S. 298, 310 (2012)). In
applying this standard to agency fees, the majority first considered whether “labor peace” is a
sufficiently compelling state interest. Id. By “labor peace,” the Court means the “avoidance of
the conflict and disruption that . . . would occur if the employees in the unit were represented
by more than one union.” Id. Although the Court recognizes maintaining labor peace is a
compelling government interest, it notes that the link between agency fees and maintaining
labor peace is lacking, as in the private sector agency fees are not permitted, yet employees
still choose to designate unions as exclusive representatives. Id. at 2465–66. Thus, even in the
absence of agency fees, there is no “conflict or disruption” that comes about when agency fee
arrangements do not exist, and the state can therefore maintain labor peace through means
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms. Id.
Next, the majority addresses the issue of “free riders,” another state interest that the
respondents would consider sufficiently compelling. “Free riders” are non-members of the
union who, in the absence of agency fees, would continue to reap the benefits of collective
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agency fees is compatible with the Court’s own constitutional jurisprudence
is not a subject about which an employee-benefits lawyer is qualified or eager
to offer comment. The benefits perspective may be useful, though, in
evaluating the likelihood of reforming some of the worst salary and postemployment excesses now common in parts of the public sector.
Janus, as many commentators have noted,25 is at least partly about
political activity and the financial engagement of public unions in the
political process. And, no doubt, some supporters of the result are delighted
that, with a bit of luck, donations to Democratic candidates from teachers’

bargaining without having to contribute monetarily. Id. at 2466. The majority believes that
such concerns are insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections. Id. The majority
reasons that there are many private groups that speak out with the intention of gaining
government support, the benefits of which will affect non-members; yet we do not think that
just because a group advocates on behalf of a certain demographic (senior citizens, for
example), that every member of that demographic should be forced to contribute to the costs
of such advocacy. Id. Accordingly, the free rider rationale does not constitute a compelling
state interest, and agency fees will fail exacting scrutiny. Id. at 2465–66.
25. See, e.g., Philip Bump, The Supreme Court’s Anti-Union Decision Marks a Clear
Shift in the Power of Working-Class America, WASH. POST (June 27, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/06/27/the-supreme-courts-antiunion-decision-marks-a-clear-shift-in-the-power-of-working-classamerica/?utm_term=.c5fd56914448 (“But unions and union members have been an important
part of turning out voters on Election Day and a key force pushing for economic policies
benefiting working-class Americans. There are a lot of asterisks that float around those
sentences, certainly, but it’s broadly the case that much of the institutional power of bluecollar America resided in the labor movement.”); Editorial, Unions and Democrats: The Janus
Decision Rocks Illinois Politics, CHI. TRIB. (June 27, 2018, 9:15 AM), http://www.chicagotri
bune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-edit-janus-court-raunerpritzker-20180627-story.html
(noting the likely reduction in political contributions from labor leaders to the democratic
party); Ian Millhiser, Springtime for Union Busting?, NATION (June 28, 2017),
https://www.thenation.com/article/springtime-for-union-busting/ (“Unions provide much of
the Democratic Party’s political infrastructure, including thousands of volunteers. Though
agency fees cannot lawfully be spent on political activity, Janus is likely to starve many
unions for cash and could cause some unions to fail entirely. That places the party of Neil
Gorsuch in a much stronger position each election year.”); Douglas Schoen, Unions and Dems
Lost Big in Janus, HILL (Jun. 29, 2018, 5:30 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/394907unions-and-dems-lost-big-in-janus (“While public employees already had the ability to opt
out of funding their union’s political arm, the court ruling will reduce the ability of unions to
influence national politics and to help give a leg up to Democratic candidates.”)
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unions26 and the likes of The American Federation of State, Council, and
Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”)27 may decline going forward.
This paper notes that there will likely be a decline in dues income,
which may reduce the frequency and/or size of political donations.28
Whether that will be a good or bad outcome is hard to predict and highly
dependent on political perspective. In Wisconsin, for example, the decline
in union membership and income has not been as catastrophic as some
predicted following Governor Scott Walker’s successful push for Act 10.29
26. Teachers’ unions, headed by the National Education Association and the American
Federation of Teachers, contributed almost $27 million in the 2018 election cycle, 95% of
which went to members of the Democratic Party. Teachers Unions, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE
POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2018&ind=L1300 (last visited
Nov. 10, 2018). Since 1990, teachers’ unions have made $178,019,174 in political
contributions, 96% of which has gone to members of the Democratic Party. Id.
27. The American Federation of State, Council, and Municipal Employees contributed
over $12 million in the 2018 election cycle, including over $1.7 million in lobbying. American
Fedn of State, County & Municipal Employees, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.ope
nsecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000000061&cycle=2018 (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).
The contributions have been overwhelmingly directed at Democratic candidates and
organizations that support such candidates. Id.
28. It is important to be clear about the mechanics of the regime at issue in Janus. Under
Illinois law, if a majority of employees in a bargaining unit vote to be represented by a union,
the union becomes the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit. 5 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/6 (West, current through P.A. 100-1114, of the 2018 Reg. Sess.). The
employees are not required to join the union but are required to pay their “fair share” or
“agency fee” to cover the costs of collective bargaining and other mandated union functions.
Id. Abood blessed this arrangement on the grounds that it maintained “labor peace” and
avoided free riding. 431 U.S. 209, 224 (1977). These arguments are taken up infra at note 24.
Mark Janus is employed by the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services. Janus,
138 S. Ct. at 2461. He objects to many of the positions taken by the union that serves as his
exclusive representative, including its position on the ongoing Illinois state budget crisis. Id.
Janus did not join the union but he was compelled to pay $535 per year in agency fees. Id.
Justice Alito, writing for the majority noted that: “[a]s illustrated by the record in this case,
unions charge non-members, not just for the cost of collective bargaining per se, but also for
many other supposedly connected activities. Here, the nonmembers were told that they had to
pay for ‘[l]obbying,’ ‘[s]ocial and recreational activities,’ ‘advertising,’ ‘[m]embership
meetings and conventions,’ and ‘litigation,’ as well as other unspecified ‘[s]ervices’ that ‘may
ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local bargaining unit.’ The total
chargeable amount for nonmembers was 78.06% of full union dues.” Id. (internal citations
omitted).
29. In an effort to address mounting state debt, in 2011 Wisconsin Governor Scott
Walker passed Act 10, which severely limited collective bargaining options for public sector
unions in the state. Jake Lubenow, Wisconsin Union Membership Plummets In Wake Of
Worker Freedom Laws, MACIVER INST. (Oct. 20, 2017), http://www.maciverinstitute.com/20
17/10/wisconsin-union-membership-plummets-in-wake-of-worker-freedom-laws/. Massive
protests ensued, mainly spearheaded by affected public sector unions. Id. According to data
collected by the U.S. Department of Labor, statewide union membership has dropped 38.5%
from 2011 to 2016, while statewide membership rates fell roughly 4% in the same span. Id.
The Wisconsin Education Association Council, the state’s largest teachers’ union, saw its
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However, the focus here is on finances for state and local governments and
not on political activity. This paper argues that one of the direct benefits of
Janus should be an almost immediate reduction in the kinds of conditions
that give rise to Methuen-type situations. Specifically, this paper notes that
a drop in income and/or membership should mean that public sector unions
will bring less clout to the negotiating table, which should lessen the pressure
elected officials feel to capitulate to financially irresponsible demands. In
addition, public unions will now have to devote energy and resources to
competing for dues-paying members. In the same way private sector
businesses typically compete for customers, public unions will have to make
the case for membership. If they cannot, it is hard to see why anyone would
mourn the demise of an organization that lacks the support of its own
membership.
To bolster the claim that the anticipated changes following Janus
will be good for state and municipal finances and taxpayers, Section I reviews
the key differences between government-provided services and those
typically offered in the private sector. Additionally, this section provides a
review of the economics and political science literature which supports the
contention that public unions consistently raise the cost of running the
government. Section II contains three miniature case studies which illustrate
the catastrophic effects that public sector unions have had on incarceration
rates in California following lobbying by unionized prison guards for a “three
strikes and you’re out” sentencing regime, public transit obligations in
Massachusetts, and the budgets of a small city in Rhode Island.30 In Section
III, this paper addresses the “labor peace” and free riding claims raised by
AFSCME in Janus and suggests that the former is inconsistent with rates of
strikes observed in right-to-work (“RTW”) states31 and that the latter
confuses coerced union support with authentic public goods such as military
defense. Section IV concludes.
membership decline from over 100,000 members in 2010 to roughly 36,000 in 2016. Id.
Moreover, revenue for Council 24 of Wisconsin’s AFSCME branch dropped from $5 million
in 2011 to $1.5 million in 2013. Steven Verburg, With dues depleted, Wisconsin’s three
AFSCME councils merge, WIS. ST. J. (May 1, 2015), https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/go
vt-and-politics/with-dues-depleted-wisconsin-s-three-afscme-councils-merge/article_136e2
e6e-c63a-503b-8aa5-ad4586ba9e1d.html. Lobbying efforts also took a hit, as AFSCME spent
over $1 million on such efforts during the 2011 cycle, while spending only $166,495 in 2016.
See generally Douglas Belkin & Kris Maher, Wisconsin Unions See Ranks Drop Ahead of
Recall Vote, WALL STREET J. (May 30, 2012, 7:57 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10
001424052702304821304577436462413999718.
30. Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political Advocacy,
60 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1223 (2008).
31. Right-to-work laws prevent unions from requiring employees who choose not to
join the union to pay agency fees in lieu of the union dues. JEFFREY A. EISENACH, NERA
ECON. CONSULTING, RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS: THE ECONOMIC EVIDENCE 2 (2015).
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I.

SHARED AND DISTINCT FEATURES OF THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
SECTORS AND THE COST OF GOVERNMENT

A.

Government is a Monopoly Provider of Many Services
(Education, Prisons, Roads, Fire, Police)

A common observation about the public sector is that it frequently
offers services as a monopoly provider: there are no direct competitors to the
police and fire departments, and drivers’ licenses, automobile license plates,
and inspections can only be obtained at a location and in a manner proscribed
by the state.32 Even public school teachers work under conditions that are
typically quite different from those in private or religious schools.33 More
than a bit of the public school union fury34 that has been directed at charter
schools is due to the fact that charters are public (i.e., paid for with tax
dollars) schools whose most remarkable feature is their lack of union contract
constraints on teacher working conditions.35 The importance of the
32. See Richard E. Wagner & Warren E. Weber, Competition, Monopoly, and the
Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas, 18 J. L. & ECON. 661 (1975).
33. See Sylvia A. Allegretto & Ilan Tojerow, Teacher staffing and pay differences:
public and private schools, MONTHLY LAB. REV., BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Sept. 2014),
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2014/article/teacher-staffing-and-pay-differences.htm.
34. In 2017, the National Education Association adopted a broad policy designed to
limit the growth of charter schools. See Lauren Camera, Teachers Union Adopts New, AntiCharter School Policy, U.S. NEWS (July 5, 2017, 12:37 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news
/education-news/articles/2017-07-05/teachers-union-adopts-new-anti-charter-school-policy.
For example, the policy dictates that charter schools must be authorized by the local school
board and will be subject to close monitoring. Id. Charter schools must also adhere to the same
regulations as public schools insofar as public meetings, record laws, and employment and
labor practices are concerned. Id.
35. In defense of the policy discussed in the preceding note, National Education
Association President Lily Garcia stated, “Handing over students’ education to privately
managed, unaccountable charters jeopardizes student success, undermines public education
and harms communities. . . . This policy draws a clear line between charters that serve to
improve public education and those that do not.” Id. Charter schools have long been criticized
for prioritizing profits over education. See generally id. Since they are not subject to many
hiring regulations that public schools are, many commentators believe that charter schools hire
unqualified teachers at a lower salary. See generally Elizabeth Lyon-Ballay, How Asa
Hutchinson Undermines Arkansas Teachers (But Campaigns on Raising Teacher Pay),
MEDIUM (Aug. 16, 2018), https://medium.com/@erlyon/hutchinson-promises-teacher-raises178c4e0c1388?sk=05b17f2fdea843a3ab606dc629652b3a. Charter schools have also been
known not to hesitate to cut funding for arts-related programs and to sacrifice a wide education
berth for a focus on standardized tests. See generally DAVID L. SILVERNAIL & AMY F.
JOHNSON, ME. EDUC. POL’Y RES. INST., THE IMPACTS OF PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS ON
STUDENTS AND TRADITIONAL PUBLIC SCHOOLS: WHAT DOES THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE TELL
US? (2014) (finding evidence that the presence of public charter schools results in lower per
pupil expenditures in traditional public schools, but noting that the available data do not paint
a clear picture of the overall effect charter schools have); James Forman Jr., Do Charter
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observation about the provision of monopoly services is this: unlike private
sector actors/employers, who must worry constantly about the behavior and
strategy of competitors, government employers generally have no such
concerns. The lack of competition, of course, when combined with voter
apathy and distraction, explains why legislators often find it expedient to
respond to public sector union demands.
A private employer cannot avoid a serious consideration of the cost
of, for example, an improved vacation or health care plan. Should a private
employer’s cost of total compensation increase in the short term, e.g., over
the life of a new, three-year contract, then that employer must figure out how
to pass on that cost to consumers, absorb the cost, or increase demand for her
product to offset the increase in expenses.36 If it is not possible to pass on
most or all of the increase to consumers, one would expect the employer to
vigorously resist demands for additional, costly benefits. The end result
should reflect a sincere effort by the employer to control costs.
In the public sector, a different dynamic governs the same scenario.
The confluence of voter apathy/distraction and need for the employer/elected
officials to worry not about cost but reelection distort the response to a
demand for more generous benefits. The elected official is not spending her
money, but the money belonging to taxpayers, who are notoriously over
reliant on their elected agents.37 Moreover, in return for more generous
benefits, the union can offer direct help to the elected official—votes and
Schools Threaten Public Education? Emerging Evidence From Fifteen Years of a QuasiMarket for Schools, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 839 (2007) (finding that the effects of charter schools
on public education in general are not substantial, but emphasizing the need for further
research in the field); Valerie Strauss, A Disturbing Look at How Charter Schools Are Hurting
a Traditional School District, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/answer-sheet/wp/2017/01/09/a-disturbing-look-at-how-charter-schools-are-hurting-atraditional-school-district/?utm_term=.e7062d8c0b78 (explaining how local spending on
charter schools in a Pennsylvania town detracts from programs designed to provide social and
academic support for struggling students); Diane Ravitch, When Public Goes Private, as
Trump Wants: What Happens?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Dec. 8, 2016),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/12/08/when-public-goes-private-as-trump-wantswhat-happens/ (characterizing the charter school movement as part of a larger political and
economic agenda of privatization).
36. See generally Edward Ring, The Ideology of Public Sector Unions vs. Private Sector
Unions, CAL. POL’Y CTR. (Feb. 20, 2012), https://californiapolicycenter.org/the-ideology-ofpublic-sector-unions-vs-private-sector-unions/.
37. For a deeper discussion of the principal-agent problem, see Sean Gailmard & Jeffrey
A. Jenkins, Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate, 53 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 324 (2009); Maria O’Brien Hylton, Friedrichs and the Move Toward Private
Ordering of Public Employee Wages and Benefits in the Public Sector, 23 CONN. INS. L. J. 177
(2016); MARK PENNINGTON, CATO INST., PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY AND THE WELFARE STATE
(2011); and Fred Smith, The Political Principal/Agent Problem, FORBES (Apr. 28, 2011, 12:39
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/fredsmith/2011/04/28/the-political-principalagent-proble
m/#35ee440c1bb1; Hylton, Central Falls, supra note 18.
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assistance with obtaining votes as well as direct financial contributions to
cover the expense of costly political campaigns—in exchange for support.38
Public sector union political contributions, like all political
contributions, are designed to support and reward the elected
official/employer in a manner that has no corollary in the private sector. It is
facilitated by ever-present problems of agency and moral hazard: the public
employer is spending other people’s money, and the presence of endless
distractions and noise make it hard even for attentive taxpayers to pay close
attention. Only when taxpayers become disgusted and push back with
propositions and other initiatives designed to control legislative spending39
do legislators discover the limits of this approach. In the meantime, though,
both the public official and the public union find that they can be very helpful
to each other.
B.

Evidence About Wages and Salaries Across the Two Sectors in
Oklahoma and Elsewhere

In a fascinating paper, W. Robert Reed, a Professor of Economics at
the University of Canterbury in New Zealand, looks at the effect of RTW
legislation on wages in Oklahoma.40 He finds that wages are higher in RTW
38. See Veronique De Rugy, Fourteen of America’s 25 Biggest Campaign Donors Are
Unions, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 5, 2014, 7:17 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/four
teen-americas-25-biggest-campaign-donors-are-unions-veronique-de-rugy/.
39. As part of a “tax revolt” going on in the country in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s,
both California and Massachusetts passed ballot measures designed to limit the state’s ability
to raise property taxes. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 1(a); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C
(1980). In 1978, voters in California passed the famous Proposition 13, which amended the
state constitution, limits the tax rate on real estate and subjects any future increase of any state
tax rate to a two-thirds majority vote in both legislative houses. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 1(a).
Proposition 13 got national attention and helped inspire a Massachusetts version two years
later in 1980, Proposition 2.5. Dennis Hale, Proposition 2½ a Decade Later: The Ambiguous
Legacy of Tax Reform in Massachusetts, 25 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 117, 117 (1993). Like
Proposition 13, Proposition 2.5 limits the extent to which the state government can increase
property taxes per year (the “2.5” represents the 2.5% limit on property tax increases), and
any attempt to exceed this amount must have a majority backing (but not a two-thirds
legislature vote). See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 21C. For a discussion on the larger context
of the tax revolt in America, see Clyde Haberman, The California Ballot Measure that
Inspired a Tax Revolt, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/17/us
/the-california-ballot-measure-that-inspired-a-tax-revolt.html; and Robert Lindsey, Many
States Moving to Limit Spending, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 1978), https://www.nytimes.com/19
78/06/26/archives/many-states-moving-to-limit-spending-coast-vote-spurs-efforts-to.html.
40. Nearly forty years after narrowly failing to pass right-to-work legislation in 1964,
in 2001 Oklahoma became the twenty-second state to enact a right-work-law. W. Robert Reed,
How Right-To-Work Laws Affect Wages, 24 J. LAB. RES. 713, 713 (2003). The state
constitutional amendment limits the ability of employers and labor unions from forcing
employees to join the union or pay money to the union as a condition of employment. OKLA.
CONST. art. 23, § 1A.
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states, controlling for the initial economic conditions of the state.41 He also
points to other studies which have concluded that RTW is positively
correlated with plant location, the rate of business formation, and
manufacturing employment.42
Given the recent and quite dramatic organized activity by teachers in
Oklahoma (and elsewhere)43 to demand wage increases and budget increases
for public education, it makes no sense to dismiss the possibility that nonagency fee environments might well lead to improved outcomes for public
employees, at least under certain conditions. Due to state law limitations on
the state’s ability to raise taxes, the Oklahoma legislature had not raised taxes
since 1990, leading many to believe that public funding for education was
severely lacking. Frustrated by low and stagnant wages, teachers in
Oklahoma gave the state legislature until April 1, 2018, to provide new
funding.44 When that deadline passed, thousands of teachers and labor
41. Reed, supra note 40, at 713.
42. Id.
43. Teacher walkouts in Oklahoma were inspired by similarly staged walkouts in West
Virginia two months earlier, which yielded a $2,000 salary increase for teachers. Jess Bidgood
& Campbell Robertson, West Virginia Walkouts a Lesson in the Power of a Crowd-Sourced
Strike, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/us/west-virginiateachers-strike.html (“Experts say the West Virginia teachers may foreshadow the future of
organized labor, especially in the public sector, at a time when its power has been eroded in
much of the country by anti-union legislation and by court challenges like the Janus case, now
before the Supreme Court, which threatens the financial viability of collective bargaining.”).
Indeed, the trend started in West Virginia spread to Arizona (20% pay raise for teachers),
Kentucky (override of Governor Matt Bevin’s proposed bill, which would have put spending
on education at a historic low), and Colorado (2% raise for teachers). See Anita Snow & Terry
Tang, Arizona Teachers End Walkout After Governor Signs Off on 20% Raise, CHI. TRIB.
(May 3, 2018, 8:44 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-arizonateacher-protests-20180503-story.html (“[Governor Doug] Ducey said the teachers had earned
a raise and praised the legislation as a real win for both teachers and students. The pay
increases will cost about $300 million for the coming year alone.”) (internal quotes omitted);
Shannon Van Sant, Kentucky Governor Apologizes for Comments on Teachers’ Strike, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Apr. 15, 2018, 7:20 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2018/04/15/602671694/kentucky-governor-apologizes-for-comments-on-teachers-strike
(“More than 30 Kentucky school districts closed Friday for the rallies. Teachers also protested
Bevin’s plan to overhaul the state pension system, among the worst-funded in the nation.
Bevin’s pension-reform bill, which he signed on Tuesday, requires new teachers to enter a
cash-balance plan, and not a traditional pension. Teachers groups say these changes to the
pension system could discourage people from pursuing a career in education.”); Danika
Worthington, Pueblo Teachers Launch Colorado’s First Teachers’ Strike in 24 Years,
DENVER POST (May 7, 2018, 10:48 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2018/05/07/puebloteacher-strike/ (“The district said a 2 percent increase for teachers would cost roughly $1.2
million annually. The district had a $3.6 million deficit this year. Additionally, the district
needs $173 million next year for building renovations and repairs to aging infrastructure.”).
44. Dana Goldstein & Elizabeth Dias, Oklahoma Teachers End Walkout After Winning
Raises and Additional Funding, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018
/04/12/us/oklahoma-teachers-strike.html.

54

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:2: 41

organizers engaged in a nine-day strike that ended when the legislature
agreed to a $6,000 salary increase for teachers and a $1,250 salary increase
for support staff.45 Although not the desired outcome for teachers, President
of the Oklahoma Education Association Alicia Priest called it a “victory for
teachers.”46
Additionally, Sarah F. Anzia, an Associate Professor at the
University of California, Berkley, Goldman School of Public Policy, and
Terry M. Moe, a Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, have
looked at the effect of public sector unions on the cost of government
operations and found that unions and the collective bargaining process
increase the costs of government in “substantially significant” ways.47 While
the results are mixed,48 there is certainly enough evidence to suggest that the
model pursued by RTW states is neither irrational nor necessarily
45. Id.
46. Id. (“To fund the measures, as well as some limited new revenues for schools, the
Republican-controlled Legislature and Gov. Mary Fallin instituted new or higher taxes on oil
and gas production, tobacco, motor fuels, and online sales. The state will also allow ball and
dice gambling, which will be taxed.”); see also Dana Goldstein, Their Pay Has Stood Still.
Now Oklahoma Teachers Could Be the Next to Walk., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/20/us/oklahoma-teachers-strike.html?action=click&modu
le=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&region=Footer (“But most instructional costs are
covered by the state, where laws and politics make it difficult to raise taxes. And it is inside
the classroom that students and parents have noticed the impact of depressed state budgets.”).
47. Sarah F. Anzia & Terry M. Moe, Public Sector Unions and the Costs of
Government, 77 J. POL. 114, 124–25 (2015) (“In sum, the cities where public sector employees
secured collective bargaining have progressed along a markedly different path than the cities
whose employees never pursued or won bargaining rights. Municipal police and fire
departments with collective bargaining spend significantly more on their employees’ salaries
than similar departments without collective bargaining. In police departments, that salary
premium has come with slightly lower per capita employment levels. But most important, we
find that the biggest gap between bargaining and nonbargaining cities is in the area of health
benefits expenditures. When it comes to health benefits for police- and fire-protection
employees, cities with collective bargaining are spending 15 to 25% more than cities without
collective bargaining.”).
48. See FRANK MANZO ET AL., UNIV. ILL. URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, LAB. EDUC. PROGRAM,
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADOPTING A RIGHT TO WORK LAW: IMPLICATIONS FOR ILLINOIS 16
(2013) (“By and large, as a policy prescription, RTW would generate harmful effects to
Illinois’ economy, lower its capacity to provide essential public services, and degrade the
quality and condition of the state’s labor force.”); EISENACH, supra note 31, at 18 (“Economists
have been studying the economic effects of RTW laws for more than four decades, and while
it is inherently difficult to isolate the effects of a single policy on economic performance, the
weight of the evidence strongly and increasingly suggests that RTW laws improve economic
performance overall. The evidence on recent economic performance in RTW and non-RTW
states presented in this study provides further support for this finding.”); Walter J. Wessels,
Economic Effects of Right to Work Laws, 2 J. LAB. RES. 55, 68 (1981) (“The general results
showed that the effects of RTW laws appear to be insignificant, with no negative effects on
wages, union membership, or union problems. On the other hand, RTW laws do have a
significant and positive effect on job satisfaction, particularly for non-union workers.”).
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inconsistent with either reasonable government expenditures or positive
compensation.
In fact, a pair of articles published by The Economist calls into
question the economic efficacy of public unions in general.49 While the
effects of unions on state and municipal economies are difficult to isolate,
there are several economists that see unions as “localized monopolies on
labor,” which generate “deadweight losses.”50 Moreover, as the number of
unionized employees rise, the incentive to maintain a high-quality standard
of work decreases, as there is less competition for well-paid union
positions.51 Accordingly, if union sizes were to shrink, logic dictates that
quality and productivity from unionized employees would increase.52
C.

Is Every Decision in the Public Sector Political?

The failure of major labor disruptions to emerge in states that do not
permit the payment of agency fees, combined with an imperfect free rider
claim, led the majority in Janus to constitutional analysis that favors freedom
of association (or freedom not to associate53 in the case of the Janus
petitioners) and the right to be free of compelled speech. Abood drew a
distinction between political speech and expenses associated with collective
bargaining.54 In the years after Abood, as its detractors mounted a long attack
on its free riding justification,55 another argument emerged in support of the
49. See How the Decline of Unions Will Change America, THE ECONOMIST (July 19,
2018), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2018/07/19/how-the-decline-of-unions-will
-change-america; Do Unions Increase Productivity?, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 22, 2007),
https://www.economist.com/free-exchange/2007/02/22/do-unions-increase-productivity.
50. How the Decline of Unions Will Change America, supra note 49.
51. Do Unions Increase Productivity?, supra note 49.
52. This is not to say that economists are anywhere near agreed on the issue of union
productivity and effects on state and local economies. Economist Richard Freeman, famous
for his literature on unions in the United States and in Europe, has often suggested that
unionization increases overall productivity, which in turn has a positive economic impact.
Richard B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, Trade Unions and Productivity: Some New Evidence
on an Old Issue, 473 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 149, 150 (1984).
53. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
54. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977) (“We do not hold that a
union cannot constitutionally spend funds for the expression of political views, on behalf of
political candidates, or toward the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to its
duties as collective-bargaining representative. Rather, the Constitution requires only that such
expenditures be financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees who do not
object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing so against their will by the
threat of loss of governmental employment.”).
55. See Trevor Burrus, Harris v. Quinn and the Extraordinary Privilege of Compulsory
Unionization, 70 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283 (2015); Andrew Buttaro, Stalemate at the
Supreme Court: Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, Public Unions, and Free
Speech, 20 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 341 (2016); Jacob Huebert, Harris v. Quinn: A Win for

56

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:2: 41

elimination of agency fees. The claim is that everything that happens in the
public sector—irrespective of the actor but including actions and speech by
public unions—is inherently political.56 If this is true, opponents of Abood
note, then a distinction between union political activity and any other union
function is impossible.
It is certainly true that any wage increase or change in benefits,
working hours, or other conditions of employment is certain to have financial
consequences for taxpayers and their elected representatives. Indeed, it is
hard to imagine any discussion between an employer and a public union that
has no financial or political ramifications. The American Federation of
Teachers (“AFT”) has, for example, taken positions on a variety of issues
that are a bit distant from the classroom but intensely political.57 Abortion
rights, for example, seems unlikely to affect the day-to-day work
environment of most teachers, but is probably of intense interest to at least
some of the female dominated membership.58
Ironically, it may be just this kind of political, but not strictly
workplace focused, activity that generated growing support over four
decades for the repeal of Abood. The biggest dissonance between unions and
their membership appears to be over intractable political questions and not
Freedom of Association, 2013-2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 195 (2013–2014); Mark S. Pulliam,
Union Security Clauses in Public Sector Labor Contracts and Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education: A Dissent, 31 LAB. L. J. 539 (1980); Edwin Vieira, Travesty, tragedy and treason:
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education and the Supreme Court’s betrayal of the constitution in
public-sector labor relations, 19 GOV’T UNION REV. 27 (2000).
56. See, e.g., Amie Nolan-Needham & Adama K. Wiltshire, Bargaining with the
Government vs. Lobbying the Government – A Distinction Without Difference, 58 ORANGE
CTY. LAW. 41 (2016).
57. See Statement by AFT President Randi Weingarten on U.S. Policy Separating
Children from Parents, AM. FED’N TCHRS. (May 30, 2018), https://www.aft.org/pressrelease/statement-aft-president-randi-weingarten-us-policy-separating-children; Stand With
Planned Parenthood, AM. FED’N TCHRS. (2016), https://www.aft.org/resolution/standplanned-parenthood.
58. A number of these positions are taken up directly on the AFT website. See id. For
example, under a “resolutions” section of its website, the union states: “WHEREAS, the
American Federation of Teachers has had a long history of support for reproductive rights and
for Planned Parenthood; and WHEREAS, attacks by extremist groups and politicians on
reproductive rights and women’s health and economic well-being are a major part of the
ongoing war on women in the United States; and WHEREAS, those opposed to safe, legal
abortions for women have demanded an end to federal funding to Planned Parenthood and
even threatened a government shutdown to get it. They have made outrageous allegations to
attack Planned Parenthood. Their goal is to ban all abortions and cut women off from needed
healthcare.” Stand With Planned Parenthood, supra note 57. AFT president Randy
Weingarten also recently attacked President Trump’s immigration policy, denouncing the
separation of children from their families and calling out the Trump administration. Statement
by AFT President Randi Weingarten on U.S. Policy Separating Children from Parents, supra
note 57.
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whether a raise or more vacation time would be desirable. For example, in
2016, 51% of union members said they would support Democratic candidates
in the next election cycle, and 29% said they would support Republican
candidates, compared to 47% for Democrats and 34% for Republicans in
2018.59
II.
A.

BARGAINING DISTORTIONS, WAGES, AND POST-EMPLOYMENT
BENEFITS: CASE STUDY SUMMARIES
California Prison Guards

Although Justice Kagan’s dissent emphasizes the ostensibly positive
contributions of public unions to the workplace,60 a balanced assessment of
59. Tim Reid & Joseph Ax, Democrats Target Union Workers Who Regret Trump Vote,
REUTERS ((May 4, 2018, 6:10 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-unionsinsight/democrats-target-union-workers-who-regret-trump-vote-idUSKBN1I5181.
60. Justice Kagan’s dissent was largely concerned with the practical consequences that
public employees will face in overturning Abood and ruling agency fees unconstitutional. See
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting). She writes: “[The majority’s] decision will have large-scale consequences. Public
employee unions will lose a secure source of financial support. State and local governments
that thought fair-share provisions furthered their interests will need to find new ways of
managing their workforces. Across the country, the relationships of public employees and
employers will alter in both predictable and wholly unexpected ways.” Id. at 2487 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting). She further emphasized that both the state and the union have considered the
agency-fee arrangement as necessary for maintaining an adequate quality of collective
bargaining, specifically because of the free rider and labor peace rationales that the majority
deemed inadequate to overcome First Amendment concerns (a more in depth analysis of the
majority’s reasoning can be found infra, note 24). Id. at 2489 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“First,
exclusive representation arrangements benefit some government entities because they can
facilitate stable labor relations. In particular, such arrangements eliminate the potential for
inter-union conflict and streamline the process of negotiating terms of employment. Second,
the government may be unable to avail itself of those benefits unless the single union has a
secure source of funding. The various tasks involved in representing employees cost money;
if the union doesn’t have enough, it can’t be an effective employee representative and
bargaining partner. And third, agency fees are often needed to ensure such stable funding.
That is because without those fees, employees have every incentive to free ride on the union
dues paid by others.”) (internal citations omitted). Justice Kagan’s concern is grounded in the
fact that judging by the number of government entities that bargain with unions that act as
exclusive representatives, eliminating agency fee arrangements subverts the labor relations
landscape that state and local governments believe are best. Id. at 2491 (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(“Without a fair-share agreement, the class of union non-members spirals upward. Employees
(including those who love the union) realize that they can get the same benefits even if they
let their memberships expire. And as more and more stop paying dues, those left must take up
the financial slack (and anyway, begin to feel like suckers)—so they too quit the union. And
when the vicious cycle finally ends, chances are that the union will lack the resources to
effectively perform the responsibilities of an exclusive representative—or, in the worst case,
to perform them at all. The result is to frustrate the interests of every government entity that
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the post-Janus landscape requires a little focus on some of the egregious
behavior those same unions have demonstrated. A little known, but useful,
example may be found in the California Correction Peace Officers
Association (“CCPOA”).61 The CCPOA represents prison guards throughout
California, and its consistent support for harsher penalties and other
initiatives designed to increase the number of prisoners has, by almost any
measure, been extraordinarily effective.62
In 2013, the CCPOA raised on average about twenty-three million
dollars per year via dues payments from members.63 The union devoted
resources in support of the state’s “three strikes” law64 and expended funds
to defeat a proposition designed to reduce sentences for nonviolent crimes.65
Whether sentences ultimately lead to a reduction in crime and/or recidivism
is, of course, the subject of some debate.66 What is certain is that the union
thinks a strong exclusive-representation scheme will promote stable labor relations.”) (internal
citations omitted).
61. The CCPOA signed its first contract in 1982 and has since become one of the most
influential unions in the state. CAL. CORRECTIONAL PEACE OFFICERS ASS’N,
http://www.ccpoa.org/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). The CCPOA annually gives twice as much
money to political contributions than does the California Teachers Association despite being
one-tenth its size. Volokh, supra note 30, at 1221–22. Although many of its contributions are
difficult to trace explicitly to a political agenda, it has made a number of clearly proincarceration efforts. For example, it gave over $100,000 to the Three Strikes policy, and
$75,000 to opponents of Proposition 36, which would have substituted incarceration for
substance abuse programs. Id. at 1222. Further, from 1998 to 2000 it contributed $120,000 to
crime victims’ groups in order to foster a tough-on-crime atmosphere. Id. Prison guard unions
in Florida, Michigan, and New York have followed similar trajectories, albeit on a smaller
scale, by endorsing candidates that are tough on crime and that will enact sentencing policies
that will keep prisoners in prison for longer periods of time. Id. at 1223.
62. Volokh, supra note 30, at 1223.
63. Sagar Jethani, Union of the Snake: How California’s Prison Guards Subvert
Democracy, MIC (May 14, 2013), https://mic.com/articles/41531/union-of-the-snake-howcalifornia-s-prison-guards-subvert-democracy#.ZE6QPyRKi.
64. Volokh, supra note 30, at 1222.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. PRYOR ET AL., U. S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE PAST PREDICTS
THE FUTURE: CRIMINAL HISTORY AND RECIDIVISM OF FEDERAL OFFENDERS 14 (2002)
(“Overall, an offender’s total criminal history score is a strong predictor of recidivism.
Rearrest rates range from a low of 30.2[%] of offenders with zero criminal history points to a
high of 85.7[%] for offenders with 15 or more criminal history points. Each additional criminal
history point is generally associated with a greater likelihood of recidivism.”); Anne Larason
Schneider, Recidivism Rate of Juvenile Offenders, 1 JUST. Q. 107, 123 (1984) (“If the reform
system strengthened the confidence of law enforcement officers, consequently increasing the
contact and referral rates while simultaneously decreasing “true” recidivism, the net effect
would be one of “no change” in recidivism, similar to what was observed here.”); Symposium,
Accomplishing the Purposes of Sentencing—Criminal History and Recidivism, 15 FED.
SENT’G REP. 185 (2003) (“The preliminary data show that the percentage of recidivating
offenders correlates generally with the criminal history score: the higher the criminal history
score, the higher the rate of recidivism. In addition, the early results suggest that the lowest
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spends in order to directly influence state public policy in a way that increases
the demand for the work its members do.67
According to Sagar Jethani, an economy and business analyst,68
prison guards in California are the “number one” source of cell phone
smuggling for prisoners.69 When the prison administration attempted to
initiate a requirement that guards go through metal detectors and remove
shoes, belts, etc., the union responded by citing a work requirement that
requires guards be paid for so called “walk time” which would include time
going through the detectors.70 Thus, the cell phone smuggling led directly to
increased compensation as the state attempted to tamp down on illegal union
member activity.71 This small, yet depressing, instance of union members’
own misbehavior leading directly to increased compensation reflects a view
of the employment relationship that is fundamentally abusive and indifferent
to legitimate taxpayer interests.

recidivism rates are found among offenders with no prior arrests or convictions. The on-going
research will evaluate the contribution to recidivism prediction from computational factors
included in the criminal history score.”); Chad R. Trulson et al., Blended Sentencing, Early
Release, and Recidivism of Violent Institutionalized Delinquents, 91 PRISON J. 255, 274 (2011)
(“Blended sentencing in the state under study allowed extremely serious and violent
delinquents one more chance to change their ways by giving 1,804 of them the benefit of the
doubt. Fortunately, the overall level of recidivism for this risky group of offenders appears
lower than that found in the literature for samples of state committed delinquents.
Unfortunately, the risk was that roughly one half of the recidivists continued to perpetrate
felony-level crimes post release. While this study cannot definitively answer what would have
happened with continued adult incarceration of these offenders, blended sentencing was the
catalyst for their juvenile system release when such offenders were eligible for continued adult
incarceration.”); Yan Zhang et al., Indeterminate and Determinate Sentencing Models: A
State-Specific Analysis of their Effects on Recidivism, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 693, 711 (2009)
(“In sum, our analyses suggest that the effects of different sentencing models on reoffending
may be largely contingent on the implementation and operation of state programs. Differences
observed may be attributable to various supervision approaches within the states, differing
expertise of state parole boards, or differing crime categories that are legislatively mandated.
Because each state has very different approaches to parole, when parole may occur, and for
what crimes offenders are eligible for parole, different classes of criminals have different
propensities for recidivism.”).
67. See Volokh, supra note 30, at 1222.
68. Jethani, supra note 63.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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California’s prison system is marked by high recidivism rates,72 the
steady dismantling of rehabilitation programs, and overcrowding.73 The
courts have intervened routinely and found that “medical, mental health,
dental care, juvenile incarceration practices, treatment of physically and
developmentally disabled inmates and due process for parolees have all been
found to be unconstitutional.”74 While some of the blame surely belongs to
the administrators, the CCPOA plays a crucial role.
It is critical to understand that as the prison population in California
is huge, so is the CCPOA. Indeed, the California Department of Corrections
is the single largest employer in the state.75 In 2009 the budget for adult
corrections was about $9.5 billion, or 9% of the state’s budget.76 Between
1984 and 2006, though, expenditures for corrections increased by 1094%,
even as overall state expenditures rose by only 294%.77 Salary increases for
corrections officers account for a substantial portion of these costs.78
The CCPOA has “emerged as one of the state’s most powerful
unions and has used its lobbying and political activities to influence elections
and legislation.”79 A good comparison with respect to political activity is
this: In spite of having only one-tenth of the membership of the California
72. California’s recidivism rate is roughly 65%, according to data collected by the
California Innocence Project. Recidivism Rates, CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT,
https://californiainnocenceproject.org/issues-we-face/recidivism-rates/ (last visited Nov. 15,
2018). Notably, the three states most comparable in population to California (Texas, New
York, and Florida) have recidivism rates of 21.4%, 42%, and 33%, respectively. Letter from
Policy Analyst Douglas Smith to Texas Senate Committee on Criminal Justice (May 2016)
(on file with Texas Criminal Justice Coalition); Samantha House, New York DOCCS:
Recidivism Rates for Ex-Inmates Hits 28-Year Low, CITIZEN (Nov. 28, 2014),
https://auburnpub.com/news/local/new-york-doccs-recidivism-rates-for-ex-inmates-hit/article_c765fdb9-3bcd-59c0-9c11-6cfe217fcd62.html; Help Reduce the Recidivism Rates in
Florida, CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/p/ken-detzner-help-reduce-the-recidivismrates-in-florida (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
73. See California’s Continuing Prison Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/opinion/sunday/californias-continuing-prisoncrisis.html (“California’s prison population is consistently among the largest in the country.
While it presents an extreme case, its problems are representative of what is happening in
prisons and jails in other states. If California would redirect its energy from battling the federal
courts to making the needed long-term reforms, it could once again call itself a leader.”).
74. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011) (finding that overcrowding in California
prisons was so severe as to constitute an Eight Amendment violation for affected prisoners).
75. Joan Petersilia, California’s Correctional Paradox of Excess and Deprivation, 37
CRIME & JUST. 207, 224 (2008).
76. Id. at 222.
77. Id.
78. Seventy percent of the corrections budget goes towards spending on staff salaries
and benefits. Id. at 224. By 2006, the average correctional officer in California earned $73,248,
over $13,000 more than the average assistant professor with a PhD at the University of
California. Id. at 225.
79. Id. at 224
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Teachers Association (“CTA”), CCPOA
contributions at twice the rate of the CTA.80
B.

makes

61
annual

political

The Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority Pension Debacle

While there are many examples of public employee retirement
systems that are underfunded and/or poorly managed,81 the Massachusetts
Bay Transit Authority’s (“MBTA”) pension gap stands out. Since 2010, the
MBTA has had more retirees drawing pensions than active workers
contributing to the fund.82 As recently as 2007, the MBTA plan was 92%
funded, which was excellent.83 Since then, the fund has deteriorated badly.
Estimates for 2016 showed that the MBTA fund would drop below 50%
funded by 2021 without an emergency infusion of cash.84 How did this crisis
develop in such a short period of time?
At least part of the problem stems from the contract between the
MBTA and its employees’ exclusive representative—the Boston Carmen’s
Union. Although the Carmen’s Union has suggested that the MBTA is
exaggerating in order to cut retirement benefits,85 the evidence is
overwhelming that the shortfall is real and a result of several factors
including poor management and exceptionally generous early retirement
options.
MBTA Chief Administrator Brian Shortsleeve noted that the
structure of the MBTA plan may need to change in order for it to remain
solvent.86 He noted, “[T]he plan provides an incentive for [MBTA]
employees to retire younger, and half of MBTA employees retire and begin
to draw on their pension while in their 50s.”87 He also noted that MBTA
retirees “earn significantly more in post-retirement pension benefits than
state employees and teachers at all ages.”88

80. Volokh, supra, note 30, at 1221–22.
81. See Beermann, supra note 17; FITZPATRICK & MONAHAN, supra note 17; NovyMarx & Rauh, Revenue Demands, supra note 17; Novy-Marx & Rauh, Liabilities and Risks,
supra note 17; RAUH, supra note 17.
82. Colin A. Young, Ballooning MBTA Pension Gap Forces Officials to Weigh Options,
BOS. BUS. J. (May 22, 2017, 7:20 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2017/05/2
2/ballooning-mbta-pension-gap-forces-officials-to.html.
83. Beth Healy, MBTA Pension Fund Needs $1 Billion, Report Says, BOS. GLOBE (May
22, 2017),https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/05/21/mbtapension/bUtQQmpyps6s
ADWqBPOKPL/story.html.
84. Young, supra note 82.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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The numbers and role of the Carmen’s Union are both critical here.
The fund, which reported about $1.5 billion in assets in 2017, has 5,786 bus
drivers, track workers, and other employees.89 It supports 6,685 retirees.90
In addition, the MBTA’s head of the retirement fund, Michael Mulhern, took
home $2.2 million in compensation in the eight years following the great
recession, including a salary of $216,329 in 2016 during which he worked
for only seven months.91 This compensation included pay for unused
vacation time of about $50,000.92 Mr. Mulhern stepped down as the fund’s
executive director “after a tumultuous period during which the retirement
board came under fire for its lack of transparency and for controversial
accounting practices.”93
The MBTA’s retirement fund problems are unquestionably the result
of poor management and unorthodox practices that seem to be implicitly
premised on the expectation that, one day, the legislature will bail the
underfunded plan out. MBTA employees “contribute less toward their
pension, retire earlier[,] and receive richer benefits” in spite of union claims
to the contrary.94 Union officials have consistently overestimated the fund’s
performance: Officials estimated 4% returns for ten years and then 7%
thereafter, when in reality it has been 3.9% and then 5.8% for the past
decade.95
Greg Sullivan of the Pioneer Institute has focused on the MBTA’s
pension woes for some time, and his work suggests that, contrary to the
Carmen’s Union narrative, the MBTA is not underfunded relative to other
transportation systems around the country.96 On the contrary, “as measured
by both passenger miles traveled and vehicle revenue hours, the [MBTA]
received the most capital funding of any of the nation’s [ten] largest transit
systems between 1991 and 2013.”97 From 1991 to 2013, the MBTA actually
ranks first in total capital spending, which includes federal funding, among
the top ten.98
89. Healy, supra note 83.
90. Id.
91. Beth Healy, Former MBTA Pension Chief Earned $2.2 Million Since 2009, BOS.
GLOBE (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/02/21/mbta-pensionchief-earned-million-since/zKG61M8EuraKL7pQqw4WJI/story.html?event=event12.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Greg Sullivan & Charles Chieppo, Commentary, MBTA Pension: A Ticking Time
Bomb, WGBH NEWS (July 5, 2017), https://www.wgbh.org/news/2017/07/05/localnews/mbta-pensions-ticking-time-bomb.
95. Id.
96. Greg Sullivan, The Myth of the Underfunded MBTA, PIONEER INST. (Mar. 16, 2015),
https://pioneerinstitute.org/better_government/the-myth-of-the-underfunded-mbta/.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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In addition to first place in state and local operating funds99 and total
operating funds,100 the MBTA has resulted in “Massachusetts residents . . .
pay[ing] more than twice as much per capita as the average for residents
served by the MBTA’s five peer transit systems when both capital and
operating funds are considered.”101 General mismanagement and growing
pension costs appear to account for most of the cost distortions.102
The Carmen’s Union and other unions that do business with the
MBTA have consistently opposed calls to revamp or privatize the MBTA’s
operations.103 The ongoing financial woes of the MBTA can only be
understood as the fallout from a dynamic between the Carmen’s Union and
the state that prioritized unusually generous benefits for early retirement (and
concomitant long payout periods). The present bleak picture is a direct
function of the MBTA board’s morally hazardous, kick-the-problem-downthe-road view of its role as employer. This failure to negotiate at arms’ length
with the Union will now force taxpayers and communities to absorb large
cost increases in order to provide ongoing service.
C.

Central Falls Rhode Island and Bankruptcy Fall Out

The painful, albeit not entirely unexpected, municipal bankruptcy in
the small city of Central Falls, Rhode Island, has been the subject of several
studies104 that likewise highlight the disastrous connection between
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Gregory W. Sullivan, The MBTA’s Problem is Not Lack of Funding, PIONEER INST.
8 (Mar. 25, 2015), http://pioneerinstitute.org/download/mbtas-problem-is-not-lack-of-fundin
g/.
102. See id.
103. Christian M. Wade, MBTA union blasts Baker’s plan for privatization, EAGLETRIBUNE (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.eagletribune.com/news/haverhill/mbta-union-blastsbaker-s-plan-for-privatization/article_2ca6a3a7-f151-5f41-9919-61bd531abe1f.html
(quoting Carmen’s Union President James O’Brien as saying that privatization of the MBTA
“isn’t good for the hardworking employees of the MBTA, and it isn’t good for the system, and
it certainly isn’t good for our riders.”); Antonio Caban, At rally, union workers resist MBTA
privatization, NEW BOS. POST (Sept. 23, 2015, 1:17 PM), https://newbostonpost.com/2015/0
9/23/ at-rally-union-workers-resist-mbta-privatization/; MBTA Workers Speak Out Against
Plans To Privatize Services, WBUR NEWS (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.wbur.org/news/2016/
02/10/mbta-privatization-plan.
104. See Jack M. Beermann, Resolving the Public Pension “Crisis”, 41 FORDHAM URB.
L. J. 999 (2014); Beermann, supra note 17; David A. Skeel, Jr., What is a Lien? Lessons from
Municipal Bankruptcy, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 675 (2015); Mary Williams Walsh & Abby
Goodnough, A Small City’s Depleted Pension Fund Rattles Rhode Island, N.Y. TIMES (July
11, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/business/central-falls-ri-faces-bankruptcyover-pension-promises.html; Mary Williams Walsh, Cuts for the Already Retired, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 19, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/business/pension-deal-in-rhodeisland-could-set-a-trend.html; Hylton, Central Falls, supra note 18.
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compliant elected officials that over-commit, often over many decades, to
very generous benefits in the process of bargaining with their public unions.
Central Falls filed for bankruptcy in 2011—the second U.S. city to
105
do so —following the depletion of its pension fund. The bankruptcy
resulted in the closure of the city’s only public library and community center,
a reduction in the city’s workforce of almost one-third and triggered a sharp
increase in property taxes in spite of an average annual household income of
only about $34,000.106
Robert Flanders, Central Falls’ receiver during the bankruptcy
process, noted that the crisis was a result of pensions promised by city
officials that were overly generous, collective bargaining agreements which
permitted employees to retire after only twenty years irrespective of age, and
rules that allowed retirees to obtain other jobs that also accrued benefits while
drawing a pension.107
Municipal bankruptcy essentially pits the claims of bondholders
against those of retirees as both groups scramble to get the city to honor
promises made to them. As Amy Monahan and others108 have noted,
“[m]illions of teachers, police officers, firefighters and other government
workers have long believed that their pensions were untouchable, thanks to
provisions in state laws and constitutions. But some of those promises are
unclear or untested.”109
In the case of Central Falls, bondholders prevailed, and significant
cuts were made to many retirees.110 Taxpayers were also forced to absorb
4% increases in property taxes.111 Specifically, workers who retired at a
105. Prichard, Alabama, has the honor of being first. See Douglas J. Watson et al.,
Financial Distress and Municipal Bankruptcy: The Case of Prichard, Alabama, 17 J. PUB.
BUDGETING ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 129 (2005); Hannah Heck, Solving Insolvent Public
Pensions: The Limitations of the Current Bankruptcy Option, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 89
(2011); Michael Cooper & Mary Williams Walsh, Alabama Town’s Failed Pension Is a
Warning, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/business/23pri
chard.html.
106. Walsh & Goodnough, supra note 104.
107. Richard Simon, Rhode Island’s Central Falls Reeling From Underfunded Pension,
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 03, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/03/nation/la-na-adv-centralfalls-20130804.
108. See Skeel, supra note 104; Amy B. Monahan, Statutes as Contracts? The
“California Rule” and Its Impact on Public Pension Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1029 (2012);
Walsh, supra note 104.
109. Mary Williams Walsh & Michael Cooper, Faltering Rhode Island City Tests Vows
to Pensioners, N.Y. TIMES (Aug 13, 2011),https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/us/13bankr
uptcy.html.
110. Hylton, Central Falls, supra note 18, at 526 (“Current retirees’ pension payments
were reduced by approximately 55% and cost of living adjustments (COLAs) were
eliminated.”).
111. Jess Bidgood, Plan to End Bankruptcy in Rhode Island City Gains Approval, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 6, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/us/central-falls-ri-to-emerge-
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young age saw their pension benefit cut by 55% and cost of living
adjustments were eliminated.112 Those whose pensions were worth $10,000
per year or less were unaffected.113 Employees who survived the job cuts
had to contribute more to their pension and work longer before they could
retire.114
The Central Falls story, while painful, was not especially surprising
to anyone who had been paying attention to the city’s finances. The promises
city officials made to police, firefighters, and other municipal workers were
simply more generous than the city could afford. Well-organized public
unions demanded these long-term financial expenditures, and elected
officials complied. Basically, both the unions and the politicians decided it
was mutually beneficial to borrow from future taxpayers in order to satisfy
present day wants. Wealthier cities may be able to play this game for some
time; moderate income and poor locales cannot overspend for very long.
And, when the bondholders are first in line, as maybe they should be,115 the
overpromising ends with painful adjustments and to some who are least able
to absorb them: the elderly and others whose return to the labor market is
likely difficult or impossible.
D.

Political and Financial Distortions

The purpose of providing these three short case studies is to
demonstrate some of the consequences of concentrated union power in the
public sector. To the extent that some observers are disappointed by Janus
and worry that it is little more than an attempt to strip public unions of the
funds they have been supplying to Democratic and left leaning political
causes,116 the behavior of the CCPOA should provoke a careful re-think. An
analysis of the behavior of police unions, especially with respect to the use
of deadly force and the punishment of officers, suggests that a similar

from-bankruptcy.html (“The plan imposes a 4 percent property tax increase in each of the next
five years while the number of city employees has fallen.”).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Hylton, Central Falls, supra note 18, at 526.
115. Skeel, supra note 104, at 687; see generally Walsh & Goodnough, supra note 104.
116. See Vince Courtney, U.S. Supreme Court’s Janus Decision: Pure Unadulterated
Politics, BAY CITY BEACON (July 23, 2018), https://www.thebaycitybeacon.com/politics/u-ssupreme-court-s-janus-decision-pure-unadulterated-politics/article_6dd04560-8ead-11e89fab-2f3665e90ff6.html; Sean McElwee, How the Right’s War on Unions is Killing the
Democratic Party, NATION (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/right-to-worklaws-are-killing-democrats-at-the-ballot-box/. See also Millhiser, supra, note 25; Schoen
supra, note 25.
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dynamic is at work.117 Aside from the policy stances, the MBTA and Central
Falls examples bring into sharp relief the financial consequences for
taxpayers once the years of profligate spending and mismanagement come to
light and it is no longer possible to ignore the fact that the long run has, at
last, arrived.
To the extent that Janus results in a decline in public sector union
political activity, policy discourse and prudent financial decision making
might well improve. Without the strong distorting effects of the union’s
financially self-interested voice, it might be possible to focus on initiatives
that will provide suitable policy results at a reasonable cost.
Public unions may be forced, as Rob Weil, director of field programs
for the American Federation of Teachers, noted, “to spend larger amounts of
time and money on membership maintenance instead of other more
progressive union activities.”118 Given that there is some evidence that
teacher-members are less liberal than their union,119 the post-Janus pressure
to be as responsive to members as possible could result in a moderation of
some unions’ views toward broad member consensus. And, with fewer
dollars to spend, the tendency to support policy initiatives that are focused
117. In a 2017 piece, the New York Times noted that of fifteen of the most high-profile
wrongful shootings by police officers over the previous three years, only one police officer
actually faced the possibility of jail time. Jasmine C. Lee & Haeyoun Park, 15 Black Lives
Ended in Confrontations With Police. 3 Officers Convicted., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/17/us/black-deaths-police.html. As of
November 10, 2018, there had been 830 people in the United States shot and killed by police
officers. Fatal Force, WASH. POST https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national
/police-shootings-2018/?utm_term=.3adb83f85f54 (last updated Oct. 1, 2018). Naturally, the
American people have called for more transparency and accountability for police officers, yet
police unions have lobbied extensively to stagnate such efforts. See Hector Villagra, Police
Union Lobbying Stymies Police Reform, L.A. PROGRESSIVE (July 24, 2016),
https://www.laprogressive.com/police-union-lobbying/ (“So why isn’t public opinion enough
– why are California politicians doing or attempting to do the exact opposite of what the public
wants? It’s because the police lobby wields an inordinate amount of power, and too few
politicians are willing to challenge it. The efforts to make body cam video and investigations
into police misconduct accessible to the public – and seemingly all major police reforms –
have been vehemently opposed by police unions and law enforcement organizations, which
work excessively to promote secrecy and avoid scrutiny and criticism.”). Police unions have
also been an under-the-radar proponent of laws that make it more difficult to publicly protest
by enacting deeper economic penalties and even possible jail time for those who engage in
particularly “disruptive” behavior. See Katherine Krueger, Police Unions are Quietly Trying
to Make it Harder to Protest All Over America, SPLINTER NEWS (Apr. 17, 2018, 12:15 PM),
https://splinternews.com/police-unions-are-quietly-trying-to-make-it-harder-to-p1825321943.
118. Larry Sand, The Political Aftermath of Janus v. AFSCME, CAL. POL’Y CTR. (Nov.
7, 2017), https://californiapolicycenter.org/political-aftermath-janus-v-afscme/.
119. See, e.g., Johnathan Rauch, The Conservative Case for Unions, ATLANTIC (July
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/07/the-conservative-case-forunions/528708/.
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only on union job creation might be reduced as well. With respect to the
CCPOA and the development of a policy about the incarceration of nonviolent offenders, one can only hope that best practices with respect to
reducing crime and recidivism will one day predominate over featherbedding for guards.120
III.
A.

“LABOR PEACE” AND FREE RIDING

The Foundations of Abood

The Court in Abood cited the maintenance of “labor peace” and the
avoidance of free riding in support of its decision permitting the collection of
agency fees.121 The majority in Janus noted that twenty-eight states and the
federal government do not permit agency fees.122 And, in the many cases

120. “Featherbedding” is the practice of hiring more employees than are necessary to do
a job, or implementing an unnecessary policy for the sole purpose of hiring more staff. E.D.
HIRSCH ET AL., THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY 456 (3d ed. 2002).
Featherbedding is most classically associated with railway workers, whose unions have
historically negotiated agreements that prohibit certain classes of employees from engaging in
work designated for a different class of employee, even though the work is similar and could
easily be accomplished by fewer people than the agreement calls for. See J.A. Lipowski,
Featherbedding on the Railroads: By Law and by Agreement, 8 TRANSP. L. J. 141, 150 (1976).
121. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 224 (1977). Writing for the majority,
Justice Stewart states: “The governmental interests advanced by the agency-shop provision in
the Michigan statute are much the same as those promoted by similar provisions in federal
labor law. The confusion and conflict that could arise if rival teachers’ unions, holding quite
different views as to the proper class hours, class sizes, holidays, tenure provisions, and
grievance procedures, each sought to obtain the employer’s agreement, are no different in kind
from the evils that the exclusivity rule in the Railway Labor Act was designed to avoid. The
desirability of labor peace is no less important in the public sector, nor is the risk of ‘free
riders’ any smaller.” Id. at 224 (internal citations omitted). In promoting the efficacy of agency
fees in the public sector, Justice Stewart further notes: “A union-shop arrangement has been
thought to distribute fairly the cost of these activities among those who benefit, and it
counteracts the incentive that employees might otherwise have to become ‘free riders’ to
refuse to contribute to the union while obtaining benefits of union representation that
necessarily accrue to all employees.” Id. at 221-22. The majority in Janus takes great care to
undermine these justifications for agency fees, noting the tenuous link between agency fees
and the maintenance of labor peace, as well as the implications were free rider arguments
taken to their logical extensions. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2457 (2018).
122. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2457 (“In Abood, the main defense of the state agency-fee
arrangement was that it served the State’s interest in ‘labor peace.’ By ‘labor peace,’ the Abood
Court meant avoidance of the conflict and disruption that it envisioned would occur if the
employees in a unit were represented by more than one union. In such a situation, the Court
predicated, ‘inter-union rivalries’ would foster ‘dissension within the workforce,’ and the
employer could face ‘conflicting demands from different unions.’ . . . [I]t is now clear that
Abood’s fears were unfounded. The Abood Court assumed that designation of a union as the
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where a union remains the exclusive representative of the employees, the
chaos and dissension the Abood Court so feared never materialized.123
The “free riding” argument is the more interesting of the two claims
and was promoted by AFSCME and its supporters in many of the briefs filed
in the case.124 The gist of this claim is that no employee should enjoy the
benefit of union representation without bearing some of the costs. Justice
Kagan explicitly noted that agency fees “prevent[] employees from reaping
all the ‘benefits of union representation’—higher pay, a better retirement
plan, and so forth—while leaving it to others to bear the costs.”125
exclusive representative of all the employees in a unit and the exaction of agency fees are
inextricably linked, but that is simply not true.” Id. at 2465 (internal citations omitted).
123. Id. at 2466.
124. Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 13–14, Janus v.
AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466) (“The free rider problem is not merely that
nonmembers will benefit from the union’s services without bearing their fair share of the cost,
but that this cost-shifting would be compelled by law. This makes it materially different from
the more general issue of free riders in the private sphere. . . . That free ridership, more
critically, would directly undermine the associational interests of union members. Under
Petitioner’s rule, even employees who favor the union’s positions or any benefits it conveys
will have every incentive to shift the costs of their representation to members - as they will be
able reap the same benefits without spending a dime. As the Internet has repeatedly shown,
individuals who get something for free cannot be counted on to voluntarily pay for it. A
decision rejecting agency fees would thus deal a severe blow to the interests of those who
choose to associate with unions. Abood’s compromise, by contrast, respects both members’
and nonmembers’ associational interests.”); Brief for Labor Law & Labor Relations
Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 21–22, Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct.
2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466) (“Employee free riding undermines states’ interests in equitable
workforce policies and risks sowing dissent in the workplace. Moreover, to the extent states
adopt public sector collective bargaining statutes because they prefer that method of setting
pay rates and other working conditions, that interest is also undermined: research shows that
right-to-work laws make it less likely that public sector bargaining units will form.”) (internal
citations omitted); Brief for Economists and Professors of Law and Economics as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 20, Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 161466) (“In sum, it is well established that free riding follows from individual economic selfinterest in the context of collective goods, even when everyone agrees that they benefit from
those goods. If individuals are not required to contribute, many who undisputedly benefit will
nevertheless withhold their contributions out of simple self-interest, and others will withhold
their contributions to avoid being taken advantage of by the free riders. A committed core may
be able to sustain itself and provide some amount of the collective good, but even if some
contributors persevere, the amount of the collective good will be sub-optimal, and will tend to
decrease further and further below the optimum as the contagion of free riding spreads,
resulting in increasing exploitation of the dwindling contributors.”); Brief for Respondent at
35, Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466) (“Free-riding is
indeed precisely what economic theory predicts when members of a bargaining unit may
choose independently whether to vote for and whether to pay for a bargaining agent. Even if
a non-member believes she benefits from the union’s representation, she may vote for the
union as representative (and reap the benefits of bargaining representation and assistance in
grievance proceedings) yet opt not to join the union to avoid paying dues.”).
125. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2488–89 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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As Professor Moorhouse has noted, analysis of the free rider doctrine
first requires attention to the theory of public goods.126 The central idea
behind the free rider claim is that union benefits are comparable to public
goods and that the agency fee is an appropriate response to a market failure
exhibited by free riders—i.e., those who enjoy benefits while declining to
contribute to their cost.127 Public goods can be distinguished from private
goods by their non-excludability and joint consumption.128
Nonexcludability simply means that the supplier of the good in question cannot
exclude others from consumption, and joint consumption means “the benefits
obtained by any single individual in consuming the good in no way reduces
the consumption benefits available to others. . . .”129 The classic example of
a public good is national defense, although there are other examples as
well.130
Professor Moorhouse argues that, with respect to non-excludability,
union political activity in the form of political contributions does not meet
the criteria in spite of superficial similarities to public goods:
Suppose, for example, union support of a lobbying effort
leads to a more favorable legal environment within which
the union operates. Presumably all union members would
benefit, contributors and non-contributors alike. Several
observations are in order: (1) in most cases, the thread from
the individual’s contribution through the union to the
recipient organization and finally through the benefit
generating process seems tenuous in terms of concrete
benefits to an individual; (2) such benefits may not be
perceived as beneficial by every union member; and (3) any
externalities arising here have nothing to do with union
administration of such donations. Many private
organizations rely on voluntary contributions, which in turn
are used to influence legislation. Unions are hardly unique
in this respect. Thus, these externalities do not justify
mandatory assessments for political causes. . . . Not only is
exclusion feasible, there is evidence that many union
members object to union involvement in political activities.
126. John C. Moorhouse, Compulsory Unionism and the Free-Rider Doctrine, 2 CATO J.
619, 620 (1982).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 620–21.
130. Examples of public goods range from language and mathematics, to clean air, the
internet, and light from lighthouses. See Public Goods: A Brief Introduction, LINUX INFO.
PROJECT (Feb. 16, 2006), http://www.linfo.org/public_good.html.

70

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:2: 41

[citation omitted] Such activities can hardly be thought of as
collective goods to those employees who object to them.131
The reasons unions do not charge a grievance procedure fee is not
that the service represents a public good, but because it allows the union to
discriminate among employees and to discipline those out of favor with the
union leadership.132
Moorhouse also notes that non-excludability assumes that the
benefits of collective bargaining are distributed equitably among union
members.133 He points out that super seniority and the use of seniority to
determine job assignments, bumping rights, job security, and access to
overtime opportunities all suggest the opposite—i.e., that benefits are doled
out in a highly uneven manner and often depend upon longevity and support
of union leadership.134
As for the issue of joint consumption, Moorhouse argues that union
membership fails to satisfy this criterion as well:
Worker A’s insurance policy protects himself and his
beneficiaries; Worker B’s moving into a union retirement
home means another worker cannot occupy that suite; and
the attention given Worker C by a nurse in the plant
infirmary means that her services are not available to other
workers during that period. The individuals appropriating
the benefits of these services are readily identifiable and can
be made to bear the costs of the services.135
Moorhouse’s arguments about free riding are, ultimately,
unpersuasive. It is true that unions do not distribute all benefits equally;
however, it cannot be denied that wage increases, improvements in health
care, and workplace safety are shared widely enough to qualify as public
goods.
The answer to the free rider problem, as Justice Alito seemed to
recognize, is not that it is not pertinent, but that constitutional considerations
simply override it.136 The free rider problem does not evaporate because of
the failure to satisfy perfectly the non-excludability and joint-consumption
criteria in every instance. The core conclusion of Janus is that, in spite of
the free rider problem, the rights of dissenting employees trump the issue of
131. Moorhouse, supra note 126, at 623.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 624.
134. Id. at 624–25.
135. Id. at 625.
136. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2469 (2018).
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how to get them to contribute toward the cost of workplace gains they will
almost certainly enjoy. An employee who detests her union’s political
speech, but likes new safety protocols, wage increases, and additional
personal leave time, now cannot be forced to pay for the perks while
distancing herself from the union’s political activity.137
Additionally, Justice Alito’s opinion in Janus flatly states that “free
rider arguments . . . are generally insufficient to overcome First Amendment
objections.”138 Justice Alito proposes that free rider arguments, taken to their
logical conclusions, are untenable.139 He rhetorically asks whether it would
seem fair to charge nonmembers of any organization that seeks government
support for a specific group of people to cover the costs of benefits received,
using groups that support veterans or the elderly as an example.140 However,
he also acknowledges the argument that public sector unions are statutorily
required to bargain on behalf of nonmembers, which puts them in a unique
position.141 Justice Alito deals with this argument by noting that there are
two reasons the payment of agency fees might amount to a compelling state
interest in the context of the free rider argument: (1) without agency fees,
unions might be unwilling to represent nonmembers entirely; and (2) there is
something fundamentally unfair about an arrangement in which nonmembers
get to reap the benefits of collective bargaining without contributing.142
To the first point, Justice Alito notes that unions continue to
represent nonmembers in the twenty-eight states that do not allow agency
fees. That is because exclusive representation confers a number of benefits
to a public union such that even if nonmembers could “free ride,” unions
would continue to seek the designation.143 For example, exclusive
representation not only forces the government employer to bargain in good
faith, but allows unions special access to employee information and allows
them to deduct dues directly from wages. “Representation of nonmembers
137. Id. at 2491 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority again fails to reckon with how
economically rational actors behave—in public as well as private workplaces. Without a fairshare agreement, the class of union non-members spirals upward. Employees (including those
who love the union) realize that they can get the same benefits even if they let their
memberships expire. And as more and more stop paying dues, those left must take up the
financial slack (and anyway, begin to feel like suckers)—so they too quit the union. And when
the vicious cycle finally ends, chances are that the union will lack the resources to effectively
perform the responsibilities of an exclusive representative—or, in the worst case, to perform
them at all. The result is to frustrate the interests of every government entity that thinks a
strong exclusive-representation scheme will promote stable labor relations.”) (internal
citations omitted).
138. Id. at 2466 (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 567 U.S. 298, 311 (2012)).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2467.
142. Id.
143. Id.

72

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:2: 41

furthers the union’s interest in keeping control of the administration of the
collective bargaining agreement, since the resolution of one employee’s
grievance can affect others.”144
In other words, this is free riding; Janus simply privileges employee
free speech over the pragmatic, budgetary concerns of public sector unions.
B.

A Word About Labor Peace

As noted, more than half of the states and the federal government
operate without agency fees.145 This has not destroyed public unions, but it
appears to have left them substantially less powerful than their counterparts
in places like Massachusetts,146 California,147 and Illinois.148 The number of
strikes, for example, is not higher in states that forbid agency fees than in
those that permitted them.149 I have not been able to locate any data that
suggests workplaces in these twenty-eight states or the federal government
are more chaotic or prone to major disruptions than comparable workplaces
in the rest of the country.150

140. Id. at 2468. To the second point, Justice Alito notes: “Nor can such fees be justified
on the ground that it would otherwise be unfair to require a union to bear the duty of fair
representation. That duty is a necessary concomitant of the authority that a union seeks when
it chooses to serve as the exclusive representative of all the employees in a unit. As explained,
designating a union as the exclusive representative of nonmembers substantially restricts the
nonmembers’ rights. Protection of their interests is placed in the hands of the union, and if the
union were free to disregard or even work against those interests, these employees would be
wholly unprotected. That is why we said many years ago that serious ‘constitutional questions
[would] arise’ if the union were not subject to the duty to represent all employees fairly.” Id.
at 2469 (internal citations omitted). As such, the statutory requirement of a union to represent
the interests of nonmembers is not sufficient to raise the free rider concern to the level of a
compelling state interest. Id.
145. Id. at 2466.
146. As of 2017, 12.4% of public workers in Massachusetts were members of a union,
according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics Table 5. Union affiliation of employed wage and
salary workers by state, BUREAU LAB. STATS., https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t05.
htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2018).
147. As of 2017, 15.5% of public workers in California were members of a union,
according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Id.
148. As of 2017, 15.0% of public workers in Illinois were members of a union, according
to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Id.
149. Indeed, of the seven biggest strikes of 2017, all seven occurred in states that
permitted agency fees prior to Janus, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Major Work
Stoppages in 2017, BUREAU LAB. STATS. (Feb. 9, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.bls.gov/ne
ws.release/pdf/wkstp.pdf.
150. Not one amicus brief filed in support of AFSCME pointed to data that establishes a
connection between right-to-work laws and a disruption of labor peace. See, e.g., Brief for
American Civil Liberties Union Supporting Respondents, Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448
(2018) (No. 16-1466) (noting that the Abood Court recognized labor peace as a compelling
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Wisconsin, after Act 10,151 has seen significant drops in union
membership (down from about 47% to 19% in the public sector since
2011152) and comparable drops in union political expenditures.153
The Wisconsin numbers suggest that at least some states can expect
a comparable response after Janus.154 How unions will manage the free rider
problem—if indeed it can be managed—remains to be seen. Massachusetts
is contemplating changes that would permit unions to deviate from the
traditional requirements of exclusive representation, although it is too early
to tell whether this will become law.155
IV.

CONCLUSION

In spite of the media attention it generated, Janus is essentially
irrelevant in more than half of the states in the U.S. Those places in which
public sector unions have played a large role since Abood are likely to see
losses in union membership, a reduced role for public unions in the political
state interest, but failing to link the collection of agency fees to the maintenance of labor
peace).
151. Act 10, or the Wisconsin Budget Repair Bill, essentially prohibits unions from
bargaining over pensions, health coverage, employee safety, hours, sick leave or vacation
time. Steven Greenhouse, Wisconsin’s Legacy for Unions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/23/business/wisconsins-legacy-for-unions.html. Base pay
can be negotiated but cannot exceed a cap set by the Consumer Price Index. Id. Public
employees have been required to contribute 6% of their salary towards their pension, and 12%
of their salary towards health care plan costs. Id. For a number of employees, this constituted
a 12% pay cut. Id. The Act also eliminated Wisconsin’s agency fee arrangement, largely
incentivizing public workers to either stop paying dues, or simply not join a union with fewer
resources and far more limited collective bargaining options. Id. While union membership has
indeed dropped, there are a number of examples in which public sector services have seen
benefits. Id. For example, the Mequon-Thiensville School District saved $560,000 after
freezing teacher salaries for two years, and an additional $400,000 by raising employee
contributions for health care. Id. Similarly, the school district in West Bend, a city north of
Milwaukee, was forced to cut class sizes and course offerings prior to Act 10, whereas now
the school district has been able to raise the retirement age for teachers and restructure the
health plan, saving $250,000 per year. Id.
152. Lubenow, supra note 29.
153. Between 2000 and 2013, the Wisconsin Education Association Council, the state’s
largest teachers’ union, spent nearly $13 million on political expenditures. See Hijacking
Campaign 2016 – Information on WEAC PAC, WIS. DEMOCRACY CAMPAIGN (June 2, 2017),
http://www.wisdc.org/ind16-500189.php. However, the union reported no independent
spending in 2014 and spent less than $300 supporting democratic candidates in 2016. Id.
154. See Maria Hylton, A Few Observations About the Curious State of Massachusetts
Labor Law: Public Sector Unions After Janus, U. CHI.-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming).
155. Id. at 3 (under a proposed bill to the Massachusetts Legislature, “[U]nions will no
longer be obliged to represent fairly all employees in the workplace although their enhanced
access to all employees’ home addresses, emails, and other contact information should allow
them ample opportunity to make the case for dues’ paying membership.”).
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process, and a renewed emphasis on better aligning members’ views with
those of the union leadership. Elected officials in states like California, New
York, Massachusetts, and Illinois may find that reduced financial support
from public unions is offset by increased freedom to evaluate expenditures
in a more rational manner akin to the approach of private sector employers.
I remain cautiously optimistic, although Massachusetts’ initial
reaction to Janus has been disappointing, as I have described elsewhere,156
and in California, the governor recently signed a bill that protects public
unions from lawsuits demanding return of agency fees that were collected
prior to Janus.157 For those worried about the loss of “labor peace,” the data
strongly suggest that this was never a legitimate concern. Those who abhor
free riding have more reason to be concerned as it appears that the
requirement to represent all employees—even those that do not want
representation and, now, do not have to pay for it—will result in some public
unions’ members bearing the costs for all. One possible outcome of this free
riding may be that public unions will have to find a way to attract (not
compel) more dollars by engaging in activity that members and would-be
members will support voluntarily. This should mean that the political
positions adopted by the leadership will more closely align with those of the
members. It is hard to see how that is anything but a positive development.
If the lessons of Central Falls, Rhode Island, and the California
prison guards teach us anything, it is that incentives always matter.
Unchecked spending by near-poor municipalities is just a catastrophe in
waiting—once the long run arrives and the elected officials and union leaders
who knew that the cost increases were unsustainable have long since retired
or moved on to higher office, the taxpayers and their dependents will have to
figure out how to live with reduced services and larger tax bills.
Similarly, the California prison guards have acted with ruthless selfinterest: more draconian penalties such as “three strikes”-type laws increase
incarceration rates and thus the demand for the work the guards perform. It
makes no real difference whether or not the public is actually safer, and the
public, relying on the presumably superior knowledge of law enforcement
and legislators, is not well positioned to investigate these matters in any
event.
Public sector unions should probably be banned altogether as
antithetical to the proper functioning of state and local governments. In the

156. Maria O’Brien Hylton, A Few Observations About the Curious State of MA Labor
Law: Public Sector Unions After Janus, 22 EMP. RIGHTS & EMP. POL. J. (forthcoming 2019).
157. Adam Ashton, State Workers Looking To Recover ‘Fair Share’ Fees Must
Overcome New California Law, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.sacbee.co
m/news/politics-government/the-state-worker/article218615695.html.

2019]

COMMON-SENSE DEFENSE OF JANUS

75

meantime, the elimination of a compelled subsidy to entities whose role is so
problematic is a good first step.

